Michael Every

Why Stablecoins Could Create Massive Demand for U.S. Treasuries

• Top takeaway Argues the US could use stablecoin-driven offshore demand to maintain dollar dominance internationally without expanding Treasury supply, since T-bill-backed stablecoins absorb foreign demand and let Treasury strategically calibrate issuance
• Proposes leaning on major energy exporters like Saudi Arabia to settle oil in dollar stablecoins, calling the setup 'petrostablecoin' as the successor to the petrodollar
• Claims paying for imports in dollar stablecoins keeps the underlying T-bills inside US entities (held by the stablecoin issuer), so no dollars physically leave the US for the goods — a balance sheet dynamic he says current accounting frameworks don't capture
• Suggests the US could split global interest rates, paying a higher dollar rate abroad than at home, since offshore stablecoin demand would bid up the offshore rate regardless of domestic conditions
• Concludes that stablecoins do not increase US sovereign liabilities as long as Treasury supply isn't expanded to back them, calling the arrangement 'a good gig if you can get it'

Stablecoins could become massive structural buyers of U.S. T-bills, since issuers back tokens with Treasury reserves held primarily in T-bills. The U.S. could engineer two dollar environments: high international demand while keeping domestic financing costs lower than abroad. The traditional 'petrodollar' framework could evolve into a 'petro-stablecoin' if energy exporters are encouraged to settle in dollar stablecoins. Expanding stablecoin supply does not create new U.S. government liabilities — T-bills already exist; stablecoin issuers simply hold them. A flywheel could form: global stablecoin demand drives token issuance, which pulls T-bills into reserves and may lower U.S. funding costs.

De-Globalization Is Forcing Nations Worldwide To Choose A Side | Michael Every

• Top takeaway Frames the current US policy mix as a coordinated "special military Operation Twist" — Treasury buybacks, the Genius/Clarity Acts enabling stablecoins, and the Iran economic war are tools to bifurcate the world into US-aligned vs. adversary camps; calls the framework "economic statecraft" heading toward neo-mercantilism (not classic mercantilism, since the US still runs a large trade deficit)
• Argues stablecoin-driven demand for T-bills is non-inflationary because the Treasury collateral stays within US entities — claims stablecoins could let the US pay for imports without expanding its on-balance-sheet liability, creating a "third dimension" to the current-account math
• Believes commodities are a multi-year secular beneficiary in a more zero-sum, re-arming world where supply chains are deliberately disrupted and physical supply (copper for grid rebuild, refined diesel) becomes the binding constraint over financial engineering
• Expects US military escalation against Iran after the November 2026 midterms; says Iran is already severely squeezed (oil revenue cut, inflation above 80-100%, soldiers/militia unpaid) and warns Iran could escalate sooner if it senses a NATO credibility test
• Flags additional escalation risks: a possible Russian mobilization after the September 19-21, 2026 Duma election, a potential NATO Article 5 test (foot over the line into a Baltic state), and coordinated multi-theater escalation; sees space-launch cadence (Trump targeting 1,000/year) as part of the same strategic picture

De-globalization is reshaping US policy into economic statecraft, the guest argues, forcing nations to choose between US-aligned finance and rivals like Iran. The guest argues stablecoins could become a multi-trillion-dollar structural buyer of T-bills, funding deficits without the inflation hit of traditional QE. A neo-mercantilist world favors physical commodities tied to real industrial use, the guest contends, like copper for grid rebuilds, rather than pure financial speculation. Bifurcation of the global economy is likely coming faster than markets expect, with currency and pipeline flows becoming geopolitical leverage tools. Commodities tied to industrial demand and long-duration Treasuries are the secular themes most likely to benefit from this de-globalizing world order, the guest argues.

The Iran Peace Deal Isn't What You Really Think | Michael Every

• Top takeaway Argues the words 'peace' and 'deal' are doing heavy lifting: what was announced looks like a memorandum of understanding, which he calls a 'memorandum of misunderstanding', so the Middle East is most likely not on the brink of peace.
• Notes the only deal details released as of the interview come from Iran's FARS news service, describing the same deal Trump vociferously rejected weeks earlier before bombing Iran again, which he finds extremely strange if that is the real text.
• Judges that at best this is a loose, performance-based understanding ('you do this if we do that') with tricky sequencing that only gradually reaches the core nuclear-uranium issue, where he sees no guarantee anything is achieved.
• Points to Trump saying in a New York Times interview that if Iran does not agree on the nuclear front within 60 days of negotiations, bombing resumes, and that Trump may end up overseeing Middle East oil, for which he wants a 20% cut.
• Calls it 'pretty damn unlikely' that Iran has agreed to give up enrichment and comply for 20-plus years, since voices inside Iran deny any such commitment, and warns both sides are spinning the story in what he describes as a propaganda environment.

The announced Iran "peace deal" is likely a conditional framework, not a settlement — Michael Every calls it a memorandum of misunderstanding. Iran's nuclear program remains the core unresolved issue; the deal only holds if Iran halts enrichment and accepts decades of monitoring. Washington and Tehran are telling conflicting stories about the terms, so investors should treat both versions as unverified messaging. Every notes Trump has threatened to resume bombing and take a 20% cut on Middle East oil if nuclear talks fail within 60 days. Treat the headline optimism with caution: outcomes range from a non-nuclear Iran to renewed confrontation, and uncertainty dominates for now.

Can We Trust This US-Iran "Peace Deal"? | Michael Every

• Top takeaway Every's top point: the words 'peace' and 'deal' are doing the heavy lifting - he puts the odds at under 50% that Iran actually agreed to give up enrichment or hand over uranium, so he treats the crisis as unresolved rather than settled.
• He notes Trump has already said publicly that if the 60-day talks produce nothing on the nuclear front he will start bombing again, and has floated wanting a 20% cut in Middle East oil - not something Every reads as peace.
• On the Strait of Hormuz, reopening is guided for Friday when the agreement is signed in Europe; oil was down only around 4% as of this interview, but he expects a shift in oil curves and a near-term wave of ships exiting that pushes energy prices and bond yields lower, and he sees no guarantee against a future closure.
• He calls it 'not going to happen' that Iran defunds Hezbollah and the Houthis - they are a defensive shield and an offensive weapon, and US-imposed restraint on Israel collides with Israel's post-October 7 first-strike doctrine.
• On the dollar he broadly shares the don't-count-it-out view that de-dollarization schemes, including the China-announced alternative payment rail he cites, are science projects unlikely to leave the lab - but warns a perceived comprehensive US loss would be a pivot point opening fissures in the dollar's global standing.

The guest puts the odds below 50% that Iran truly gave up uranium enrichment, calling the announcement a memorandum of misunderstanding. Oil prices fell only about 4% despite repeated Hormuz closure threats, which he reads as the market underpricing the risk of a renewed closure. He expects the oil forward curve (future price expectations) to shift as a one-way wave of queued tankers hits the market after reopening. Gulf states will keep building pipelines that bypass Hormuz whatever the deal says, locking in the region's energy Plan Bs. China can ride out an oil cutoff for up to six months, so he expects the 60-day negotiation window to stretch past November's US midterms.