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How Investors Can Win the Critical Minerals Global War with Expert Tomasz Nadrowski

MiningStockEducation.com Mar 19, 2026

Summary

China has quasi-monopolized and weaponized critical mineral supply chains, forcing the West to rebuild value chains where geopolitics matters as much as geology.

The guest argues effective policy needs three levers: upstream reference prices, tariff protection, and downstream incentives to adopt Western instead of Chinese materials.

China's deepest monopolies are heavy rare earths, gallium, flake graphite, and tungsten, where it controls roughly 82% of production.

Gallium and germanium are best extracted at alumina and zinc refineries rather than mined directly, so processing-stage players capture the value.

China's Africa resource-for-infrastructure model is hard to replicate, and Africa now sends more capital to China than it receives.

Key points on Anglogold Ashanti

  • The guest says he began his career in the equity markets and business development arm of AngloGold Ashanti, formed from Anglo American's gold and uranium division, during an effort to replace South African gold reserves with projects across roughly 50 jurisdictions.
  • He recalls concluding that effort was partly futile because, geologically, little outside Russia compares to South Africa's gold reserves.

Bill Powers's takeaways

  • Top takeaway As host, Bill Powers frames the episode around how investors can profit from the critical minerals conflict with China and presses the guest on price floors, tungsten, gallium, germanium, Africa, Indonesia's nickel, and US policy whiplash.
  • He draws on prior examples such as Trilogy Metals' on-again, off-again permits to question whether projects like the Korea Zinc Tennessee smelter survive a change of administration.

Thomas Nadrowski's takeaways

  • Top takeaway Thomas Nadrowski argues China has quasi-monopolized and weaponized critical mineral supply chains, so Western investors must evaluate whole value chains — offtake, processing, and government policy — where geopolitics now matters as much as geology.
  • He proposes three policy levers: upstream reference prices to attract capex, tariffs to protect them from subsidised Chinese dumping, and downstream subsidies funded by tariff revenue to shift users toward Western or allied materials.
  • He ranks China's tightest monopolies as heavy rare earths (dysprosium, terbium, yttrium, samarium), gallium, and natural flake graphite, with tungsten fourth at about 82% of production control as of his 2025 figure.
  • On China in Africa, he says the resource-for-infrastructure, FOCAC-backed model with guaranteed Chinese offtake removes price, offtake, financing, and jurisdictional risk, so the West cannot replicate it, while Africa now nets roughly $17 billion a year back to China against a $100 billion-plus current account deficit with it — a structure he calls unsustainable.
  • On exits, he runs about a three-year horizon in a very high-volatility space ( VaR figures around 22-25% at 95%), trades around inventory and investment cycles, took profits on lithium in February 2026, and is currently cautious on tungsten and lithium while warning against exiting prematurely before new Western price floors establish themselves.